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Risk and insurance in low-income agriculture
THE COSTS OF UNINSURED RISK for low-wealth agricul-
tural and pastoral households are well documented.
Risk makes people poor when it leads them to shy
away from higher-return but riskier activities. Risk
also keeps people poor when it leads them to pursue
defensive savings strategies that cut off pathways
from poverty that they could traverse via sustained
accumulation of productive assets. Finally, risk de-
presses the development of the deep agricultural
finance markets in a region that can be important to
the growth and development of the small-farm sector.
Insurance is a potential solution to these problems of
pervasive and costly risk. Yet, insurance is most
notable for its absence in low-income rural areas.
While there are many reasons why insurance con-
tracts are not offered in these areas, the innovation of
a new generation of financial technologies built around
the concept of parametric or index insurance raises
the prospect that insurance instruments could be made
to sustainably work in low-income environments. It
remains to be seen if these index insurance products
can resolve the problems of poverty and thin financial
markets, yet the first challenge is to innovate and pilot
effective, livelihood-focused index insurance contracts
for which there is effective demand.
Unfortunately, the complexity of index insurance
contracts stands as a potential barrier to creating
effective demand. These contracts present particular
problems for populations that have little experience
with formal insurance, much less complex index-based
contracts. Progress requires innovative efforts to
enhance the understanding and financial literacy of the
people that might purchase and benefit from index
insurance. This BASIS Brief details one strategy that
aims to solve this problem of financial literacy for
those who have never been insured.
Index insurance basics
The idea of index insurance is straightforward. In
contrast to conventional insurance contracts, which
separately calculate losses and pay indemnities for
each insured individual, payouts under an index contract
are not based on individual outcomes. Instead, they are
based on the outcome of an aggregate index. Because
an individual’s outcome does not often perfectly match
this aggregate index, index insurance covers only a
fraction of the risk the producer faces. The risk that is
not covered is referred to as “basis risk.”
Using a data source that is promptly, reliably, and
inexpensively available (and cannot be manipulated by
either the insurer or the insured), an index insurance
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contract makes the agreed indemnity compensation
payment to insured beneficiaries whenever the data
source indicates that the index reaches the “strike
point,” or insurance activation level.
Consider the case of an area yield contract in which
the index is determined by a reliable measure of
average yields in a valley. If the long-term average
yield is 40 quintals of cotton per hectare, then the
insurance might be activated at a strike point of 35
quintals (that is, when the average yield index falls
below 87.5% of its long-term average). If the average
yield index fell to 30 quintals, then individual farmers
would receive a payment equal to the contractually
stipulated value of 5 quintals per hectare insured (the
strike point level minus the realized average yield).
Because it is not necessary to verify individual losses,
transactions costs with index insurance are modest, a
feature that is especially important if coverage is to be
offered to small farmers and other low-wealth agents.
For agricultural contracts, index insurance can be
based on measures of average area valley yields (as in
the example above), climatic information, or satellite
information on ground cover and plant growth. For
livestock contracts, possible indices include those based
on average mortality, forage availability or rainfall
measures, and satellite measures of vegetative cover.
An important advantage of index insurance is that it
preserves effort incentives for producers. No indi-
vidual farmer can increase the probability of an
insurance payout by working less hard. In other
words, index insurance does not suffer from the
problem of moral hazard. Index insurance also is
unaffected by the problem of adverse selection, which
occurs when only the individuals most likely to suffer
a loss purchase insurance. In the case of index
insurance, it does not matter who purchases the
insurance, as payouts do not depend on the personal
characteristics of those who actually purchase the
insurance. Together with the low transactions costs,
the absence of moral hazard and adverse selection
problems suggests that the market should be able to
sustainably provide index insurance to the small
farmer and pastoralist sectors in the developing world.
Why comprehension is important
—and challenging
Index insurance can only reduce risk and deepen
agricultural financial markets if there is sustained and
informed demand for it. However, effective demand
for insurance may be weak among a population
unfamiliar with insurance. Insurance is an intangible
good that offers stochastic benefits: sometimes
insurance offers a benefit and sometimes it does not.
If farmers misunderstand or underestimate the value
of the stochastic benefits of a well-designed insurance
contract, then there will be little demand for the
contract and little or no impact on farmer behavior.
Conversely, if farmers overestimate the value of the
benefits (especially with index insurance, which offers
only incomplete coverage of losses), then they are
likely to be disappointed and fail to purchase insurance
again in the future. Without training potential buyers in
financial literacy, it is unlikely that index insurance
contracts will solve the problem of agricultural risk.
Recent efforts to implement index insurance have
struggled with making it easily comprehensible. In
India, a microfinance institution had to redesign and
restart an index insurance program based on a rainfall
contract after there were massive cancellations of
contracts by farmers disappointed by the lack of
payments in a normal year. Clearly, these farmers did
not fully understand the stochastic nature of the
benefits provided by insurance.
In a Malawi project, farmers were offered insur-
ance bundled with a loan to see if including insurance
would increase loan take-up to finance higher-risk,
higher-return strategies by eliminating some of the
risk. Counter intuitively, take-up rates were substan-
tially lower among farmers offered the insurance than
those offered a basic loan (Giné and Yang 2008).
Statistical analysis showed that there were significant
differences in education between farmers who took
up loans with insurance and those who did not, but this
difference is not there in the case of basic loans. It is
possible that the complexity of the insurance meant
that those farmers with lower levels of education who
were offered the bundled product simply were not
comfortable enough with their understanding to want
to purchase the product.
As a cautionary tale on educating farmers about
risk, however, the researchers Giné and Yang discuss
the possibility that farmers who were offered the
insurance were also presented information on weather
risk, which may have increased their perception of
risk and decreased take-up. The importance of good
financial literacy training is likely to be a key to
successful agricultural insurance products.
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Figure 1 shows two ways of looking at the index
insurance contract for cotton producers that BASIS
researchers are implementing in the Pisco Valley in
Peru, in conjunction with a local insurance company, a
local microfinance institution, and an international
reinsurance company. The contract is based on an
average area yield index, with payouts made when
average yields in the Pisco Valley fall below a speci-
fied strike point. Individual farmer outcomes are highly
but imperfectly correlated with average valley
yields—in other words, farmers individually can do
better or worse than the average.
The smooth curve in Figure 1 shows the estimated
probability distribution of the Pisco cotton yield index,
while the lines show the payoffs received by farmers
when the index reaches the indicated strike point.
While perhaps adequate for communicating the nature
of the index contract to individuals with statistical
training, the figure is somewhat opaque for most of us.
Somewhat more easily comprehensible is the payout
table to the right of the figure, which is from the
publicity flyer distributed to advertise the program.
While this table more clearly shows the payouts to
farmers when the index reaches certain levels, it does
not fully communicate the benefits to the farmer when
compared to an uninsured situation. Communication of
the stochastic benefits of insurance clearly requires a
more comprehensive approach.
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Figure 1. Index insurance contracts for Pisco Valley cotton 
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Experimental economics games
for financial education
Experimental economics is a relatively new branch of
economics whose methods can help individuals under-
stand the complexities of index insurance and evaluate
its value. Economic experiments can be designed to
reliably elicit people’s behavior in complex circumstances
that involve strategic considerations and uncertainty.
These experiments often employ real economic
incentives, where participants receive financial
payments based on their performance and outcomes
in the experimental setting. They also often exploit the
ability to repeat games multiple times so that individu-
als can understand the complexities of the situation
they face and learn the behavior that best suits them.
For index insurance, which offers a stochastic
benefit that only appears from time to time, experi-
mental economic methods offer the prospect of letting
individuals play and replay their lives and farming
decisions, with and without insurance, over a short
period of time so that the benefits of the insurance can
be understood and evaluated.
Much of the remainder of this brief will discuss an
experimental economics game based on the Peruvian
cotton insurance project described above. A key
feature of this game is that participants receive a
payout based on their financial outcomes in the game
and their decision whether or not to purchase insur-
ance. As in the real world, insurance comes at a cost,
but it also lessens the likelihood of unfavorable out-
comes. One challenge of designing an experimental
economics game is to make sure that the game
incentives closely match those of the real world.
A second challenge is to minimize the cognitive leap
from the game to the real world. Much of the classic
experimental economics research has been designed to
uncover general patterns of behavior that are context
free. The goal of experimental economics games for
financial literacy is somewhat different, as a primary
motive of the game is to assist learning about an
unknown insurance product. In contrast to context-free
experimental economic research, the games described
below are carefully framed to correspond closely to
reality so that what the individual learns in the game
can be easily transferred to their real economic lives.
Minimizing the cognitive leap from game to reality
Figure 1 illustrated the index insurance contract being
made available to cotton farmers in Peru’s Pisco Valley.
In an effort to create informed understanding of this
contract, BASIS researchers designed an experimental
economics game that duplicates the precise structure of
the Pisco index insurance contract. Doing so requires a
game that faithfully replicates the workings of the
insurance, the workings of uninsured basis risk, and the
impacts of both on farmer incomes.
As a first step in designing the game, the continuous
probability distribution for average Pisco yields shown
in Figure 1 was broken into five discrete chunks. The
result of this “discretization” is shown in the lefthand
table in Figure 2. When the average yield index is very
Figure 2. Determining yield and luck 
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low (as happens one year in ten), the average yield
index will be about 23 quintals of cotton. In the game,
this outcome is represented by one black poker chip
that is put into an “average yield sack” that contained
a total of 10 poker chips of differing colors.
Similarly, in the middle part of the distribution (which
happens 40% of the time), yields are expected to be
37 quintals. In the game, this outcome is represented
by four white poker chips that were included in the
average yield sack. Similar calculations were carried
out for the other chunks of the true probability distri-
bution, and the lefthand table in Figure 2 represents
the full contents of the average yield sack.
As in the real world, an individual farmer’s yield
outcome not only depends on averages in his or her
area, but also on individual luck or variation around
that average. As part of the ex ante analysis of the
insurance design, farm level yield data were used to
estimate the degree of basis risk, which is simply
yield variation that is not explained by the average
yield index. Analogous to the probability distribution
shown in Figure 1, a probability distribution for basis
risk was also estimated.
The resulting distribution of basis risk was again
discretized and broken into the three pieces shown in
the righthand table in Figure 2. An “individual luck
sack” was formed, containing one purple ball repre-
senting bad luck (individual yields below average), two
white balls representing average luck (individual yields
equivalent to average), and one orange ball represent-
ing good luck (individual yields better than average).
Once these two sacks were assembled, the partici-
pants were trained in understanding the forces that
would determine their yields in the game. Each
participant was given a fictive land endowment of two
hectares and was assigned to a “valley.” At the
beginning of each round of the game (representing a
year), one farmer from the valley would pick a chip
from the average yield sack, which determined the
valley’s average yield result in that year. Each indi-
vidual within that valley then picked an individual luck
ball that determined whether his or her outcome would
be below, equal to, or above the average yield for the
valley in that game year.
Once the basic mechanics of yield determination
were understood and practiced by everyone, individuals
were presented with different production strategies.
Initially, individuals were presented with two options.
The first was a high yielding commercial cotton produc-
tion strategy in which the farmer allocated all his or her
fictive land endowment to the production of cotton. To
undertake this strategy, individuals were told that they
had to borrow funds to purchase inputs.
Using accurate information on input costs, interest
rates, and the value of cotton, a net farmer income was
calculated for each possible cotton yield generated by the
combination of poker chips and individual luck draws.
The payout table (see Figure 3, next page) shows the
various possibilities under the commercial cotton produc-
tion option. Notice that in valleys with very low averaged
yields (as happened one year in ten, or when a black chip
was drawn) farmers had insufficient earnings to even
repay their bank loan, and they were left in debt and with
zero earnings to keep for themselves.
Participants also were offered a second option for
cultivating their fictive land endowment. Instead of
borrowing money and putting all land into cotton,
individuals could choose a safer, lower returning
alternative calibrated on what a farmer could expect
with minimal input purchases and dividing his or her
land between cotton and food crops. A similar finan-
cial payoff matrix was constructed for this option.
With these two options explained, farmers played a
sequence of low stakes, or learning, rounds. At the
beginning of each round, each farmer chose his or her
Choosing a chip from the “yield sack.” The color of the chip
determines the average yield for the valley that game year.
Photo by Julio Cesar Casma. Used by permission
from La Positiva Seguros y Reaseguros Peru.
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production option. Farmers were told that they would
receive a real monetary payment based on their
results from one of the later rounds of the game. (In
addition, farmers received a payout based on the value
of their land, as is explained below.)
During the low stakes round, an unfavorable rate of
exchange was established between game payoffs
(shown in the payout table) and real money. These
low stake rounds were established so that the farmers
could experiment and learn the mechanics of risk as
captured in the game. After the low stakes rounds, a
set of high stakes rounds was then played. A more
favorable exchange rate was established for these
rounds, giving the farmer sharp incentives to make his
or her game choices carefully.
Finally, farmers were introduced to a third option based
on the Pisco index insurance contract. Under this option,
farmers dedicated all their land to cotton, borrowed
money to finance a complete set of inputs, and paid the
market price for an index insurance contract. Payouts
were determined only by average valley outcomes
(determined by poker chips) and not by individual luck. A
small payment was made to insured farmers when a red
chip (low yield) was drawn, and a larger payment was
made when a black chip (very low yield) was drawn.
Insurance premiums and payouts were based on the
actual Pisco cotton insurance contract illustrated in
Figure 1. Under the payoff structure, farmer returns
were lower in good years, but higher in bad years. In
addition, insurance eliminated the possibility of default.
Low and high stakes rounds were again used to
allow farmers to first experiment with insurance and
then (motivated by the high stakes) settle on a desired
strategy. In most cases, farmers settled on a preferred
strategy by the time of the high stakes rounds, consis-
tently choosing one of the three options across all
rounds of the high stakes game.
Capturing the benefits of insurance
Crop yield insurance is designed to help farmers smooth
out the rough spots. Payments received in bad years
substitute for lost income, allowing individuals to smooth
their consumption over time. In many situations,
insurance offers a second important advantage. An
uninsured farmer who borrows to pursue a commercial
strategy risks losing his or her land if a drought leaves
him or her unable to repay a loan in which his or her
land was used as collateral. Empirical work on risk
rationing reveals that some 20% of small farmers may
refuse to take out loans precisely because they fear
losing the assets on which their future livelihood
depends (Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger 2008).
In this context, insurance can offer an important
second benefit. It allows people to preserve their asset
base for use in the future. Realistically capturing this
inter-temporal benefit is important in any game
designed to allow individuals to fully understand how
insurance works.
In the design of the Pisco cotton game, BASIS
researchers originally gave each player land title
certificates for each of the two hectares they had
available for production in the game. Any player
unable to repay a loan used to finance a high-return
production strategy had to forfeit one unit of land and
its corresponding land title certificate. Analogous to
the real world, the player’s future earning prospects
Figure 3. Payout table 
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were thus diminished by this land loss. In addition, as
final player payoffs included payments for land in their
possession (to represent the value of passing land on
to their heirs), lost land further diminished earnings.
While game design pre-testing revealed that farmers
readily understood this default mechanism, it proved to
be a too-powerful incentive for insurance purchase in
the game. It also made the game quite competitive as
individuals enjoying teasing fellow players who lost their
land. While it is true that Peruvian lenders threaten to
seize land in the event of default, such threats are
rarely implemented. In order to better capture the real
world incentives, the game was modified such that
defaulting individuals (1) lost access to the credit
system for future rounds, and (2) were paid a lower
value at the end of the game for land against which
a credit lien was still held.
Other types of agricultural or livestock systems
may present distinctive types of inter-temporal
incentives. The photograph to the right shows
women in the arid northern region of Kenya
playing an index insurance game framed on the
reality of their pastoral economy. Research from
this region has indicated the presence of poverty
traps: herds that fall below a critical threshold
tend to collapse back toward a small herd size
(a poverty trap equilibrium), while herds above
that threshold tend to exhibit positive growth
over time towards a higher-level equilibrium
(see Lybbert et al. 2004 and Barrett et al. 2006).
To capture this complex reality, BASIS research-
ers designed a game in which each player is given
chips to represent a stock of animals. The color of
the chip represents either a large animal (for
example, a cow or camel) or a small ruminant (for
example, a sheep or goat). In the game, ten small
ruminants are equivalent to one large animal.
During each time period of the game, a net herd growth
rate (which becomes negative in bad conditions when
mortality is high) is randomly determined by drawing
balls from two different sacks. In one sack, the color of
the ball drawn determines the average growth or
mortality rate. In the second sack, the type of face
marked on the ball determines the individual-specific
idiosyncratic variation around that average.
Each round represents a six-month period consisting of
a rainy season and a dry season. To capture the growth
dynamics implied by a poverty trap threshold, each
player had to give up five small stock animals (equivalent
to half of a large stock animal) during each time period to
cover consumption needs for his or her family. The
effect of this fixed cost was to create an expected
growth rate that is negative for herd sizes of fewer than
seven livestock units, and positive for larger herds.
While not entirely faithful to the processes that
seem to create poverty traps, this simplified approach
was easy to explain and understand and could be
implemented in the field where rudimentary conditions
prohibit complex designs. By playing multiple rounds
of the game, participants could begin to understand the
impact of insurance on herd size and stability.
Two-way learning
The games just described offer two-way learning.
First and foremost, the games were designed as a
learning opportunity for the potentially insured. Ongo-
ing research in Peru is probing the effectiveness of
the games as a learning tool. Given findings in other
studies that insurance uptake is enhanced when
trusted local leaders recommend it (see Cole et al.
2008 for India), a long-term strategy may be to focus
the games on a local cadre of respected farmers who
can understand and then share their knowledge and
recommendations with their broader communities.
Kenyan farmers play the index insurance
game with BASIS researchers.
Photo by John McPeak.
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B r i e f s
In addition to this primary type of
learning, the experimental economics
games discussed here also provide important
lessons for the design of insurance contracts
and their likely impacts. In the case of the
Pisco cotton insurance project, variants of
the game (with different contractual
parameters) were played with local leaders,
including heads of irrigation commissions
and the cotton farmers’ association. Their
play revealed greater uptake for insurance
with an intermediate strike point (payoffs
begin when yields fall below 85% of their
long-term average) than for either a lower
(65%) or a higher (90%) strike point.
After a debriefing discussion with this
group, the final insurance contract was set
with an 85% strike point.
The games can provide information on
the effective demand for insurance
contracts. Unlike abstract questions about
whether people might “like” to have
insurance, the games put the actual
product on the table with its market price
attached. In Peru, the game was played
with a random sample of almost 500
cotton farmers in Pisco. Almost 60% of
them purchased insurance in the game.
The Pisco game also provided some
information on what the behavioral effects
of index insurance might be. In the early
rounds of the game, when farmers could
choose only between the safe, low return-
ing activity and the uninsured, debt-
financed commercial activity, roughly 25%
chose the former. These “risk-rationed”
farmers kept themselves poorer on
average than they needed to be given the
options offered to them. Interestingly,
when the index insurance contract was
added to the options, more than half of
these risk-rationed farmers shifted to the
high-return activity, both borrowing money
and purchasing insurance. It is this kind of
behavioral change that index insurance is
meant to induce.
To date, the game in Kenya has been
played in only five communities in a pre-
testing mode. Yet, 100% of the pastoralists
playing the game purchased at least some
insurance. Those that built up larger levels
of livestock in the game tended to insure
only a portion of their herd, while those
with fewer livestock tend to insure their
entire herd.
It remains to be seen if these game
results translate into actual purchases of
insurance. BASIS researchers are care-
fully tracking this, so stay tuned for results
in future BASIS Briefs!
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